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Samuel R.  Bagenstos  
 
Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes on Voting 
Rights After Shelby) 
abstract.  After the Supreme Court’s decision in Shelby County v. Holder, voting rights 
activists proposed a variety of legislative responses. Some proposals sought to move beyond 
measures that targeted voting discrimination based on race or ethnicity. They instead sought to 
eliminate certain problematic practices that place too great a burden on voting generally. 
Responses like these are universalist, because rather than seeking to protect any particular group 
against discrimination, they formally provide uniform protections to everyone. As Bruce 
Ackerman shows, voting rights activists confronted a similar set of questions—and at least some 
of them opted for a universalist approach—during the campaign to eliminate the poll tax. 
 Universalist responses have many possible strengths: tactically, in securing political 
support for and broader judicial implementation of laws that promote civil rights interests; 
substantively, in aggressively attacking the structures that lead to inequality; and expressively, in 
emphasizing human commonality across groups. But they have possible drawbacks along all 
three of these dimensions as well. Although scholars have addressed some of these strengths and 
drawbacks in the context of specific proposals for civil rights universalism, no work has 
attempted to examine these issues comprehensively. This essay attempts such an examination. 
 
author. Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. Thanks to Rick Hasen, Sam 
Issacharoff, Ellen Katz, Rick Pildes, and, as always, Margo Schlanger, for comments on earlier 
drafts. 
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After the Supreme Court invalidated the core of the Voting Rights Act’s 
preclearance regime in Shelby County v. Holder,1 civil rights activists proposed a 
variety of legislative responses. One set of responses, which gained quick favor 
in influential precincts in the legal academy, sought to move beyond measures 
like the Voting Rights Act that targeted voting discrimination based on race or 
ethnicity. These responses instead sought to eliminate certain problematic 
practices that place too great a burden on any individual’s vote.2 I will call 
responses like these universalist (or, sometimes, universalistic), because rather 
than seek to protect any particular group against discrimination, they provide 
uniform protections to everyone (at least as a formal matter). As Bruce 
Ackerman shows in his latest We the People volume, voting rights activists 
confronted a similar decision regarding whether to pursue a universal 
approach—and at least some of them opted for universalism—during the 
campaign to eliminate the poll tax.3 
The voting rights context is hardly unique. Across an array of different 
contexts, scholars and activists have proposed universalist responses to address 
problems that group-oriented civil rights approaches have not fully resolved. 
These contexts include affirmative action in higher-education admissions, 
regulation of the employment relationship, disability inequality, and the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment generally.4 My own work has 
often advocated such universalist responses to civil rights problems.5 
 
1.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
2.  The most notable set of proposals in this regard came from Samuel Issacharoff’s Beyond the 
Discrimination Model on Voting, 127 HARV. L. REV. 95 (2013) [hereinafter Issacharoff, 
Discrimination Model], which builds on themes Issacharoff sounded earlier in Samuel 
Issacharoff, Is Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act a Victim of its Own Success?, 104 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1710 (2004). Issacharoff’s longtime collaborator, Richard Pildes, provided the first 
comprehensive defense of a turn to a universalist approach while the 2006 Voting Rights 
Act reauthorization was pending. See Richard H. Pildes, The Future of Voting Rights Policy: 
From Anti-Discrimination to the Right to Vote, 49 HOWARD L.J. 741 (2006). For other notable 
examples, see Richard L. Hasen, Race or Party?: How Courts Should Think About Republican 
Efforts to Make it Harder to Vote in North Carolina and Elsewhere, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 58 
(2014); and Daniel P. Tokaji, Responding to Shelby County: A Grand Election Bargain, 8 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
3.  See 3 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 83-126 (2014). 
4.  See infra Part I. 
5.  See, e.g., SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 51-54, 145 (2009) [hereinafter BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS] (advocating 
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Universalist responses have many possible strengths: tactically, in securing 
political support for and broader judicial implementation of laws that promote 
civil rights interests;6 substantively, in aggressively attacking the structures 
that lead to inequality;7 and expressively, in avoiding essentializing identity 
and emphasizing human commonality across groups.8 But they have possible 
drawbacks along all three of these dimensions as well. Scholars who advocate 
universalist approaches to civil rights problems have too often conflated the 
tactical, substantive, and expressive arguments for these positions or simply 
focused on whichever of these dimensions supports a universalistic position 
without considering the others. These errors, I will argue, have led those 
scholars to be unduly sanguine about the effectiveness of universalism in the 
civil rights context. 
To assess the effectiveness of universalistic approaches to civil rights—
whether in general or in a particular case—requires examination of each of 
three dimensions: tactics, substance, and expressivism. As I hope to show in 
this essay, when considered along all of these dimensions, neither universalistic 
nor particularistic approaches can fully address our civil rights problems. Even 
in any specific context—whether voting, higher education, employment, 
disability, or the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment—a mix of 
universalistic and particularistic approaches is likely to offer the most traction 
in addressing those problems.9 And determining the proper mix of policies will 
require a highly context-specific analysis. Nonetheless, there are some common 
dynamics of universalistic and targeted civil rights policies, and these dynamics 
offer lessons for policymakers approaching any given civil rights context. In 
this essay, I aim to draw out some of these general lessons and then sketch how 
they might apply to the civil rights context in which questions of universalism 
are most acute at the moment—voting discrimination. I argue, against 
 
universal health insurance and universal workplace accommodation requirements to address 
problems of disability inequality); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social 
Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV. 225 (2013) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Employment Law] (arguing 
that universal provisions of employment law can serve equality interests). 
6.  See infra Part II. 
7.  See infra Part III. 
8.  See infra Part IV. 
9.  In this regard, my prescription accords with that of Desmond King and Rogers Smith in 
DESMOND S. KING & ROGERS M. SMITH, STILL A HOUSE DIVIDED: RACE AND POLITICS IN 
OBAMA’S AMERICA (2011). See also Rogers M. Smith, Ackerman’s Civil Rights Revolution and 
Modern American Racial Politics, 123 YALE L.J. 2906 (2014). 
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Professor Issacharoff and others, that the response to Shelby County will fail 
unless it goes well beyond universal protections of voting rights. Rather, the 
voting rights regime must also provide robust protection against race 
discrimination specifically.  
i .  examples of universalist approaches to civil  rights law  
At this point, readers may be wondering exactly what I mean by 
universalist approaches to civil rights law, and how important the debate over 
universalism is to civil rights controversies. This Part provides some answers to 
these questions. I begin, in Section I.A, by offering the working definition of 
universalism that will guide my analysis in this essay. As I explain, mine is not 
the only definition of universalism one could employ, and I do not offer it as a 
way to draw a crisp line between what does and does not come within the 
category. Rather, I offer it simply as a serviceable device for identifying and 
assessing an important phenomenon in debates over civil rights law. In Section 
I.B, I identify a number of contexts in which advocates and scholars have urged 
universalist solutions to civil rights problems. I begin with an historical 
example from Professor Ackerman’s book—the debate over the poll tax—
before turning to present-day examples. 
A. A Working Definition of Universalism 
As I show throughout this essay, scholars have proposed deemphasizing 
targeted approaches to civil rights problems and instead emphasizing 
universalist approaches across a range of contexts. But what do I mean by 
“universalist”? For purposes of this essay, I define a universalist approach to 
civil rights law as one that either guarantees a uniform floor of rights or 
benefits for all persons or, at least, guarantees a set of rights or benefits to a 
broad group of people not defined according to the identity axes (e.g., race, 
sex) highlighted by our antidiscrimination laws. What is crucial for my 
purposes is not just that members of different identity groups are entitled to be 
treated the same as each other under a universalistic statute, but that we can 
determine each individual’s entitlement without considering identity groups at 
all. By this definition, a law that guarantees all workers $10 per hour would be 
universalistic. But a law that prohibits race discrimination in wages would not. 
Under the former law, we can determine whether a worker’s rights have been 
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violated without identifying her race or the race of anyone else. Under the 
latter law, by contrast, we must identify the race of the worker who asserts a 
violation of her rights, as well as the race of the workers whom she alleges 
received better treatment, to make a cross-racial comparison.10 
Nothing in my argument depends on the category of universalistic 
approaches having a tight and impermeable boundary. The quality of 
universalism may be best understood as lying on a spectrum, running from 
more to less universalist. What I call universalistic strategies are often closely 
intertwined in practice with strategies targeted to particular groups or axes of 
discrimination. Indeed, my basic argument is that most civil rights problems 
are best addressed by a mix of strategies, though the solutions to some should 
place more emphasis on universalism and the solutions to others should place 
more emphasis on targeting.  
B. Examples of Universalistic Approaches to Civil Rights 
As Professor Ackerman’s latest We the People volume highlights, arguments 
in favor of universalistic approaches are hardly new. As Ackerman shows, in 
the decades-long fight to eliminate the poll tax, advocates pursued two 
different strategies. Many civil rights advocates saw the poll tax as one of 
several means by which states discriminated against African-American voters. 
Others, including President Franklin Roosevelt and even politicians such as 
Senator Spessard Holland who supported racial discrimination in voting, saw 
the problem of the poll tax in more general populist terms.11 They sought a flat 
ban on the use of the poll tax as a voting qualification, without any inquiry into 
 
10.  Of course, one could understand laws prohibiting race discrimination as universalist to the 
extent that they protected members of all races equally. But because laws that specifically 
call attention to identity status share a set of dynamics that are different from the dynamics 
of laws that do not require any reference to identity status—and because this difference is an 
important one to explore—I treat those laws as targeted for purposes of my argument. In 
that sense, my understanding of universalism is narrower than one some might offer. By 
contrast, my understanding of a universalist approach is broader than the one employed by 
Jessica Clarke, who excludes “traditional labor standards (i.e., the minimum wage as 
opposed to equal pay) that do not find antecedents in antidiscrimination laws” from her 
definition. Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace 
Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1221 n.11 (2011). As I show in the remainder of this Part, 
commentators have often proposed labor or welfare standards that do not find antecedents 
in antidiscrimination laws (such as just-cause termination regimes and universal health 
insurance) as a means of achieving civil rights goals. 
11.  See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 85-86. 
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whether or when it discriminated on the basis of race. The universalistic 
approach prevailed in the Twenty-Fourth Amendment, which prohibited using 
the poll tax as a qualification for voting in elections for federal office.12 
Professor Ackerman shows that section 10 of the Voting Rights Act, which 
directed the Attorney General to challenge poll taxes in states that still 
employed them,13 contained elements of the universalistic and of the targeted 
approaches.14 
The Supreme Court ultimately chose the universal path to invalidating the 
poll tax in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections.15 As Professor Joey Fishkin 
describes the developments in voting rights law in the 1960s and early 1970s: 
“Rather than simply dismantling race discrimination in voting, American law 
took a dramatic universalist turn, sweeping away almost all the bases of 
suffrage restriction that remained in 1960 and establishing a nationwide norm 
of universal adult suffrage tied closely to individual citizenship.”16 
In recent years, scholars have argued that voting rights law is increasingly 
turning (and should increasingly turn) toward Harper’s universalistic approach. 
Professors Sam Issacharoff and Rick Pildes have noted that some of the most 
significant voting legislation in recent years—notably the National Voter 
Registration Act17 and the Help America Vote Act18—has been universal in 
scope.19 Furthermore, as both Issacharoff and Pildes point out, recent waves of 
constitutional voting litigation—drawing on the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Bush v. Gore20 and other Supreme Court cases elaborating the right to vote—
have similarly applied a “new model” of voting rights, “one grounded on a 
non-civil rights vision of fundamental guarantees” that accrue to all voters.21 
 
12.  See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
13.  42 U.S.C. § 1973h (2006). 
14.  See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 107-09. 
15.  383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
16.  Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J. 1289, 1345 
(2011). 
17.  Pub. L. No. 103-31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993). 
18.  Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1665 (2002). 
19.  See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 109-110; Pildes, supra note 2, at 757. 
20.  531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
21.  Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 104; see also Pildes, supra note 2, at 759 
(“[O]ne of the vastly underappreciated consequences of Bush v. Gore is its recognition that 
the Constitution protects the right to vote from being arbitrarily infringed, for any reason at 
all, whether or not race is involved.” (internal citation omitted)). Issacharoff and Pildes set 
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Pildes argues that the “redefinition of the problem from protection of 
minority voting rights to protection of voting rights as such”—as reflected in 
these legal developments—“represents the future of voting rights.”22 He, and 
other similarly minded scholars, tout universalistic solutions to civil rights 
problems. In response to the Supreme Court’s Shelby County decision, 
Issacharoff proposes that Congress adopt a regime of “smart disclosure” that 
would apply to all voting changes for federal elections, and that would set the 
stage for challenges to those changes if they violated any voter’s rights.23 In a 
piece published while Shelby County was pending, Pildes similarly argues that 
“the more effective approach is to think in terms of solutions, federal or state, 
that eliminate unnecessary barriers”—such as obstacles to voter registration 
and practices that cause long polling-place lines—“and protect the right to vote 
in general, uniform terms.”24 Professor Hasen similarly argues for reliance on a 
universalistic constitutional jurisprudence of voting rights.25 
Calls for universalism have extended to many civil rights contexts beyond 
voting as well. Indeed, Professor Kenji Yoshino has defended a universalistic 
approach to the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment in general.26 He 
argues that the Supreme Court has, as a result of “pluralism anxiety,” shifted 
its interpretation of that amendment from emphasizing group-oriented 
equality-based dignity claims to emphasizing more universal liberty-based 
dignity claims. He contends that this shift is likely a positive development 
because universalistic claims are more persuasive and inclusive.27 
In the area of higher-education admissions, for example, commentators 
have argued for a number of years that schools should abandon race-based 
affirmative action and replace it with “race-neutral” efforts to achieve diversity, 
 
forth their understanding of the emerging constitutional jurisprudence enforcing a universal 
right to vote in Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Bush v. Gore and the Constitutional 
Right to Vote, in ELECTION ADMINISTRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: THE STATE OF REFORM 
AFTER BUSH V. GORE (Michael Alvarez & Bernard Grofman eds., forthcoming 2014). 
22.  Pildes, supra note 2, at 760. 
23.  See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 121-23. 
24.  Richard H. Pildes, We Need a Broader Approach, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR DEBATE, Feb.  
24, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/02/24/is-the-voting-rights-act-still 
-needed/we-need-a-broader-approach. 
25.  See Hasen, supra note 2. 
26.  See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747 (2011). 
27.  Id. 
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whether through something like the Texas Ten Percent Plan28 or through some 
sort of class-based affirmative action.29 Whether these strategies are best 
understood as “race neutral” is a matter of heated debate30—debate that will 
illuminate my arguments in the remainder of this essay. But advocates of these 
alternative admissions policies have certainly argued for them in universalistic 
terms. The Supreme Court’s recent Fisher decision, by highlighting the Court’s 
continued skepticism of explicitly race-based affirmative action, is likely to 
stoke further interest in these universalistic alternatives.31 
In the area of employment law as well, numerous commentators have 
argued that universalistic approaches can best serve civil rights interests. In an 
important recent article, Professor Katie Eyer argues that advocates should 
pursue what she calls “extra-discrimination remedies” to attack discriminatory 
conduct in the workplace.32 She includes just-cause termination requirements, 
the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and other workplace flexibility 
laws, and general workplace antibullying laws as among the extra-
discrimination remedies to which civil rights advocates should look.33 Along 
similar lines, Professor Evan Gerstmann argues that state laws protecting all 
workers against discrimination based on lawful off-duty conduct may be 
superior to group-based legal protections in protecting gay and lesbian 
 
28.  See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of 
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1311-12 & n.100 (2011) (describing 
conservatives’ advocacy of “percent plans” as an alternative to race-based affirmative action). 
29.  See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, Class-Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1037 
(1996) (arguing for class-based affirmative action on moral, legal, and political grounds). 
30.  See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2433 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“[O]nly an ostrich could regard the supposedly neutral alternatives as race 
unconscious.”); Brian D. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and 
the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 290 (2001) (arguing that “although these 
novel admissions schemes are facially race-neutral, they are no less unconstitutional than the 
racial preference policies they replaced”). 
31.  Fisher, 133 S. Ct. 2411; see John B. Judis, The Unlikely Triumph of an Affirmative Action 
Prophet, NEW REPUBLIC, July 18, 2013, http://www.newrepublic.com/article/113669/richard 
-kahlenberg-class-based-affirmative-action-prophet. 
32.  Katie R. Eyer, That’s Not Discrimination: American Beliefs and the Limits of Anti-
Discrimination Law, 96 MINN. L. REV. 1275, 1341 (2012). 
33.  See id. at 1345; see also Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093 
(arguing that the FMLA is better suited to eradicating entrenched workplace inequality than 
are Title VII and the Pregnancy Discrimination Act); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil 
Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1443 (1996) (arguing for just-cause termination as a means of achieving civil rights ends). 
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workers.34 Professor Michelle Travis cites the medical examination provisions 
of the Americans with Disabilities Act—which protect all workers, regardless of 
whether they have disabilities, against certain medical inquiries—as an example 
of a universalistic approach that will help to achieve equality goals.35 In separate 
works, Professor Rachel Arnow-Richman and I have advocated universalistic 
workplace accommodation requirements.36 And I have argued that universal 
health insurance would help eliminate “the most significant barrier to 
employment for people with disabilities.”37 
As the foregoing discussion suggests, universalistic approaches to civil 
rights problems have had many influential advocates in recent years. The 
remainder of this essay examines the arguments for and against those sorts of 
approaches, before looking closely at how these arguments apply to the post-
Shelby voting context.  
i i .  tactical advantages of universalist approaches 
Some of the most prominent arguments for universalism have been 
essentially tactical. The tactical arguments posit that universalistic approaches 
are more likely to survive legal or political challenges than those that are more 
targeted. I argue in this Part that these arguments are sometimes, but far from 
always, true. 
 
34.  EVAN GERSTMANN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL UNDERCLASS: GAYS, LESBIANS, AND THE FAILURE 
OF CLASS-BASED EQUAL PROTECTION 180-81 (1999). For a general discussion of off-duty 
conduct laws as a protection of social equality, see Bagenstos, Employment Law, supra note 5, 
at 247-53. 
35.  Michelle A. Travis, Toward Positive Equality: Taking the Disparate Impact Out of Disparate 
Impact Theory, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 527, 552-59 (2012). 
36.  See BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 53-54 (arguing for a requirement that 
“would demand that employers design physical and institutional structures (including work 
schedules and work tasks) in a way that reasonably takes account of the largest possible 
range of physical and mental abilities, and that they provide reasonable flexibility to all 
potential employees whose physical or mental abilities still are not taken into account,” but 
recognizing that such a radical requirement is unlikely to be adopted); Rachel Arnow-
Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law and Voluntary Action in 
Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1108-12 (2010) (arguing for a right for 
all employees to request workplace accommodations and receive a written response from 
their employer). 
37.  BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 129, 145. 
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A. The Tactical Argument for Universalism 
When arguing in the tactical vein, advocates have urged that universalist 
approaches are more durable in two realms. One realm is political—universalist 
approaches, their supporters contend, can retain political support and avoid 
political backlash where targeted alternatives cannot. The second realm is 
judicial—judges and juries may read targeted civil rights laws narrowly, the 
argument goes, but they will read and implement universalistic laws more 
broadly. There is obviously some overlap between these arguments, as judges 
and juries are a part of and influenced by broader political trends.38 
Nevertheless, the political and judicial aspects of the tactical arguments raise 
some slightly different issues, and I will address them separately. 
1. Secure Political Support 
Much of the advocacy of universalism is self-consciously political. Michelle 
Travis argues, for example, that the “most important[]” reason for adopting 
universal workplace protections is that “non-group-conscious regulation of 
particular employment practices currently enjoys greater political viability than 
attempts to expand the list of legally protected social identity groups.”39 
Advocates of race-neutral affirmative action have often pressed similar political 
arguments.40 In my own work urging universalist approaches to address 
problems of disability inequality, I have looked to the history of American 
social welfare policy, in which broader, universalist interventions have often 
proven to be more politically popular than more narrowly targeted ones.41 
Years earlier, William Julius Wilson made a similar political argument for 
policies that did not focus on racial minorities but instead on “the truly 
 
38.  The extensive literature on political, social, and judicial backlash against the Americans with 
Disabilities Act, for example, highlights the ways in which political and judicial trends 
interact with and reinforce each other in this context. See, e.g., BACKLASH AGAINST THE ADA: 
REINTERPRETING DISABILITY RIGHTS (Linda Hamilton Krieger ed., 2003). 
39.  Travis, supra note 35, at 564. 
40.  See, e.g., Kahlenberg, supra note 29, at 1062-64. 
41.  See BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 143 (“Looking at the history of the 
American welfare state in general, there seems to be a great deal of evidence to support the 
notion that broad social insurance programs fare better politically than do more targeted 
interventions.”). For a discussion of some of the complexities of the point as applied to the 
disability context, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability and the Tension Between Citizenship 
and Social Rights (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
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disadvantaged” of all races.42 Relying on some of the same work in social 
welfare policy, Professor Kenji Yoshino argues that a universalistic liberty-
based approach to equal protection can help to overcome political resistance 
born of “equality fatigue” and resistance to identity politics.43 One reason for 
this dynamic is that universalist interventions have a broader base of support. 
Professor Mary Anne Case, for example, argues that advocating for flexible 
scheduling for all workers is likely to be more politically successful than 
advocating for flexible scheduling for parents alone, because the universalist 
frame “would broaden the coalition for such change and potentially reduce the 
possibility for zero-sum games among employees.”44 
2. Ensure Broad Judicial Implementation  
Sometimes, the tactical arguments for universalist interventions have 
focused not on the political system generally but on predictions of how the 
courts will respond. In recent years, courts have often read antidiscrimination 
laws narrowly.45 This might be because judges think of them as feel-good laws 
that legislators can’t publicly oppose.46 Or it might be because they think of 
targeted laws as simple interest-group transfers.47 It might also stem from 
what Kenji Yoshino calls “pluralism anxiety,” in which judges, like other public 
 
42.  See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, THE 
UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 118 (1987). 
43.  See Yoshino, supra note 26, at 794-95. 
44.  Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About Where, Why, and 
How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753, 1768 
(2001). 
45.  For an influential discussion, see generally Jed Rubenfeld, The Anti-Antidiscrimination 
Agenda, 111 YALE L.J. 1141 (2002). I highlighted the problem of courts’ narrow readings of 
the ADA in BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 46-47. 
46.  Justice Scalia’s description of Voting Rights Act preclearance as a “racial entitlement” in  
the Shelby County argument seems to rest on this sort of view. See Amy Davidson, In  
Voting Rights, Scalia Sees a “Racial Entitlement,” NEW YORKER, Feb. 28, 2013, 
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/closeread/2013/02/in-voting-rights-scalia-sees-a 
-racial-entitlement.html (quoting Justice Scalia: “Even the name of it is wonderful: the 
Voting Rights Act. Who is going to vote against that in the future?”). 
47.  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term—Foreword: The Court and the 
Economic System, 98 HARV. L. REV. 4, 14-18 (1984) (arguing that courts should interpret 
interest-group legislation narrowly); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory 
State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 471 (1989) (arguing “that courts should narrowly construe 
statutes that embody mere interest-group deals”). 
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actors, fear that targeted civil rights laws divide us into different group-based 
“fiefs.”48 In equal protection cases, this skepticism is reinforced by, or perhaps 
instantiated in, the constitutional law doctrines that impose strict scrutiny on 
even “benign” racial discrimination.49 Influential judges—and Justices—have 
recently suggested that various antidiscrimination laws, notably those that 
prohibit practices with unjustified disparate impacts, might trigger, and fail, 
strict scrutiny, and they have cited that concern as a reason for reading those 
statutes narrowly.50 The increasing conservatism of the courts makes all of 
these responses increasingly likely.51 
Alternatively, courts’ narrow readings of antidiscrimination laws may stem 
from their narrow understandings of what constitutes “discrimination.” 
Extensively reviewing the psychological literature, Professor Katie Eyer shows 
that people consistently think of discrimination as something that involves 
individual fault and discriminatory intent on the part of the perpetrator—and 
that they are often unwilling to attribute negative outcomes to discrimination 
even in the presence of strong evidence of such fault and intent.52 She 
persuasively argues that the restrictive interpretation of civil rights laws reflects 
judges’ and jurors’ adoption of this narrow psychological frame for 
understanding discrimination.53 When a person injured by an employer’s 
conduct labels that conduct “discrimination,” for example, she may trigger 
defensiveness on the part of the employer54—a defensiveness that judges and 
jurors, who tend to believe that discrimination is rare, will likely indulge and 
share. In my own work expressing skepticism about structural approaches to 
antidiscrimination law, I have similarly argued that judges are hostile to efforts 
 
48.  Yoshino, supra note 26, at 747-48. 
49.  See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). 
50.  See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594-97 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
51.  See Dahlia Lithwick, The Courts: The Conservative Takeover Will Be Complete, WASH. 
MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2012 (“[T]he one legacy of which George W. Bush can be most proud 
is his fundamental transformation of the lower federal judiciary—a change that happened 
almost undetected by the left.”). 
52.  See Eyer, supra note 32, at 1292-1318. 
53.  See id. at 1318-1327. 
54.  See Katharine T. Bartlett, Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in 
Reducing Implicit Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009). 
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to expand civil rights law beyond “the paradigm of a fault-based understanding 
of ‘discrimination.’”55 
Universalist approaches may avoid these problems. “Because the operative 
issue” under a universalist workplace protection regime “is not whether a 
particular individual has been discriminated against—but rather whether the 
set of facts presented can fulfill a distinct (and typically more straightforward) 
set of statutory or judicial requirements,” Eyer argues that a judge or jury 
therefore need not resolve “the difficult and psychologically contingent 
question of whether discrimination truly took place.”56 She contends that a 
move toward universalistic approaches (which she calls “extra-discrimination 
remedies”) is likely to make a significant, positive difference in the ability of 
discrimination victims to vindicate their claims in court.57 In the disability 
context specifically, I have argued that a universal requirement of workplace 
accommodation—not limited to people with disabilities—can help prevent 
judges from “see[ing] their job as vigorously policing the line between those 
who are in and those who are out of the protected class.”58 
B. Problems with the Tactical Argument 
These tactical arguments are powerful. But there is reason to believe that 
universalist approaches to civil rights laws will often have the opposite tactical 
effect—that they will undermine political and judicial support for their 
enforcement. Moreover, the tactical arguments for universalist approaches rest 
on a questionable empirical premise—that actors in the political and judicial 
systems will understand those approaches as protecting everyone instead of as 
benefitting particular groups. To the extent this premise does not hold, 
universalist approaches to civil rights problems are unlikely to realize their 
supposed tactical advantages. This Section addresses those possibilities.59 
 
55.  Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1, 45 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos, Structural Turn]. 
56.  Eyer, supra note 32, at 1346. 
57.  Id. 
58.  BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 46. 
59.  Of course, not all of these arguments are consistent with each other. Many are in fact in 
tension. But that underscores my fundamental point in this essay: that the choice between 
universalism and targeting cannot be made in the abstract but only on the basis of a careful 
examination of the context at issue. 
 
the yale law journal 123:2838   2014  
2852 
 
1. Undermine Political Support and Dilute Judicial Willingness to Enforce  
Compassion fatigue may limit the utility of a universalist response to civil 
rights problems. Many tactical critiques of universalism rest on the premise 
that there is “a small, fixed quantity of goodwill for civil rights causes.”60 If 
that premise holds, extending protections beyond the most compelling cases 
may undermine political support for those protections. Professor Jessica 
Clarke, for example, argues powerfully that universal workplace bullying laws 
will trivialize the cause of ending sexual harassment by lumping those who 
experience sexual harassment with those who are making a federal case out of 
something that sounds like relatively minor, childish behavior.61 Clarke 
similarly argues that laws guaranteeing workplace flexibility for all employees 
will undermine support for accommodations for workers who take care of 
family members, because such laws will tie those accommodations to the most 
trivial reasons an employee might have for wanting to be away from work.62 
The erosion of support might occur in legislatures, where representatives could 
be less willing to push for broader universalist laws than for narrower targeted 
ones. Or the erosion might occur in the judiciary, where overworked judges 
could look for excuses to knock cases brought under these broader laws out  
of court. 
The implicit premise in Clarke’s argument is important—the “civil rights” 
label has a powerful cachet in American politics.63 If political and judicial actors 
believe that an intervention is really a civil rights law, they are willing to accept 
that it should override their baseline preference against regulation of 
businesses and state and local governments.64 But they continue to have a 
 
60.  Julie C. Suk, Race Without Cards?, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 111, 114 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD 
THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS 
WORSE (2008)). 
61.  Clarke, supra note 10, at 1263-66. 
62.  Id. at 1278-79. 
63.  For a recent effort to harness the political power of the civil rights label to obtain support for 
collective bargaining rights, see RICHARD D. KAHLENBERG & MOSHE Z. MARVIT, WHY LABOR 
ORGANIZING SHOULD BE A CIVIL RIGHT (2012). 
64.  This is at least part of the thought behind Justice Scalia’s labeling of Voting Rights Act 
preclearance as a “racial entitlement.” See Davidson, supra note 46. Note also the arguments 
of many disability rights supporters, in the wake of courts’ initial narrow readings of the 
ADA, that judges failed to understand that the statute was really a civil rights law. See, e.g., 
Matthew Diller, Judicial Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & 
LAB. L. 19, 23 (2000). 
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narrow understanding of what kinds of interventions deserve the civil rights 
label. And universalist approaches, which extend beyond protecting the 
particular groups or axes of identity that seem to raise the most pressing claims 
of justice, will push common understandings of civil rights beyond most 
people’s limits.65 As a result, those approaches will lose the support that comes 
with the civil rights label and may be unable to overcome political and judicial 
resistance to regulating businesses and state and local governments. 
Housing and Urban Development Secretary George Romney’s efforts to 
pursue economic integration of the suburbs, discussed in Professor Ackerman’s 
chapter on “The Breakthrough of 1968,” provide an excellent example of this 
dynamic. As Professor Ackerman notes, “Romney wanted to force the suburbs 
to open their doors to subsidized housing for poor people of all races,” because 
“[e]conomic, not merely racial, integration was his goal.”66 Romney’s efforts, 
which marked a universalizing step beyond prohibiting race discrimination in 
housing, provoked a massive backlash.67 When President Nixon gave in to the 
backlash (one with which he agreed68), he retreated to a position that, at least 
on its face, supported strong enforcement of the Fair Housing Act’s 
prohibitions on race discrimination.69 
Relatedly, the political process has proven to be particularly responsive to 
some groups of beneficiaries of civil rights laws. People with disabilities, for 
example, have often proven able to mobilize targeted legislation on their 
behalf.70 And there are more general reasons why targeted laws may draw more 
political support than universalist approaches do. For one thing, powerful 
currents in public choice theory generally predict that laws with narrowly 
targeted beneficiaries and broadly distributed costs are likely to be highly 
 
65.  See FORD, supra note 60, at 176. 
66.  3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 218-19. 
67.  Troublingly for both sides of the universalism debate, they provoked a backlash largely 
because they were understood as mainly benefiting racial minorities, and indeed as being 
the most effective means of achieving racial integration in housing. See CHRISTOPHER 
BONASTIA, KNOCKING ON THE DOOR: THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S ATTEMPT TO 
DESEGREGATE THE SUBURBS 103, 105-07 (2006). I will return to this point. 
68.  See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 222-23. 
69.  See id. For some well-taken doubts as to how strong Nixon’s support of the anti-
discrimination principle was in this context, see BONASTIA, supra note 67, at 109-10. 
70.  See BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 144; see also Jonathan Zasloff, Children, 
Families, and Bureaucrats: A Prehistory of Welfare Reform, 14 J.L. & POL. 225, 308 n.259 (1998) 
(arguing that disability welfare programs have fared well politically because their 
beneficiaries have “substantial political support among the general public”). 
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politically resilient.71 For another, targeted laws will often achieve their goals 
more efficiently than universalist approaches, and the political process may 
reward this efficiency.72 
The political case for universalism is therefore more complicated than the 
advocates suggest. In many circumstances, universalist approaches to civil 
rights problems are likely to be less politically and judicially resilient than are 
targeted approaches. 
2. Become Coded as Serving a Particular Group  
There is a second major problem with the political argument for 
universalism. That argument assumes that a universalist approach will avoid 
the backlash that often accompanies legislation designed to advance the 
interests of a particular, perhaps stigmatized, group. But it is far from obvious 
that the social and political understanding of a law will so closely track its legal 
form. To the contrary, even a universalist law that is motivated by a desire to 
serve a particular group may soon be understood as essentially targeting that 
group. 
Many of the critiques of class-based affirmative action make a form of this 
argument. Professor Richard Fallon, for example, suggests that “economically 
based affirmative action” programs may, “once in operation, . . . generate 
significant division and resentment, especially if they [a]re broad in scope.”73 
Professor Randy Kennedy argues, even more sharply, that “[t]he day after 
affirmative action is ended, right-wingers who were previously singing the 
praises of race-neutral alternatives will all of a sudden begin perceiving that 
these alternatives also ‘victimize’ whites, deviate from meritocratic standards, 
and so on and so forth.”74 George Romney’s efforts to impose economic 
 
71.  See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). This notion, too, 
seems to be part of the inspiration behind Justice Scalia’s “racial entitlement” comment. 
72.  This is the basic political argument of PETER H. SCHUCK & RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER, 
TARGETING IN SOCIAL PROGRAMS: AVOIDING BAD BETS, REMOVING BAD APPLES (2006). 
73.  Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Affirmative Action Based on Economic Disadvantage, 43 UCLA L. REV. 
1913, 1939 (1996). Note also Professor Wilson’s argument that the Great Society’s reliance 
on means-tested anti-poverty programs associated the Great Society with minorities and 
made it politically vulnerable. See WILSON, supra note 42, at 125-39. 
74.  Randall Kennedy, Affirmative Reaction, AM. PROSPECT, Feb. 19, 2003, http://prospect.org 
/article/affirmative-reaction; see also RANDALL KENNEDY, FOR DISCRIMINATION: RACE, 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, AND THE LAW 177-79 (2013) (giving examples of prominent 
affirmative action opponents who have argued that percentage admissions plans are 
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integration on the suburbs provide an example here—they provoked a backlash 
precisely because racial minorities were understood as their principal 
beneficiaries. In a different context, I have argued that even when disability 
activists pursue universalistic solutions to their civil rights problems, they are 
likely, “by their very participation,” to lead the public to associate those 
solutions with people with disabilities particularly.75 
A number of commentators have identified examples of this dynamic in 
work/life policies. As Clarke shows, “in many workplaces, even universally 
available flexible work arrangements and leave policies are regarded as special 
accommodations for caretakers or ‘mommy tracks.’”76 As a result, laws 
requiring universal workplace accommodations—like the FMLA—may 
encourage discrimination by employers, and may feed public stereotypes that 
women are and should be the principal caregivers in society.77  
 
*  *  * 
 
As a simple tactical matter, then, the effects of a universalistic approach to 
civil rights are ambiguous. In some settings at some times—notably where 
targeted approaches are highly contentious and the universalist alternatives are 
relatively non-burdensome and are not understood by political and judicial 
actors as simply replacing targeted measures—universalist approaches are 
likely to be more tactically effective than targeted ones. But in others—notably 
where universalist approaches impose significant burdens on regulated entities 
or are politically understood as really being aimed at achieving targeted goals—
they will be less so. 
 
unconstitutional on the same grounds). For a careful if now somewhat dated exploration of 
this issue from a constitutional perspective, see Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional 
Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88 GEO. L.J. 2331 (2000). 
75.  BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 145. 
76.  Clarke, supra note 10, at 1271. 
77.  See Michael Selmi, Is Something Better Than Nothing? Critical Reflections on Ten Years of the 
FMLA, 15 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 65, 67 (2004) (arguing that to the extent that the FMLA 
“has had any effect at all on” gender stereotypes or discrimination against women in the 
workplace, “the statute has likely exacerbated both, though probably only to a socially 
insignificant degree”); see also Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REV. 223, 
290-300 (2000) (arguing that the FMLA likely has a negative effect on the wages of female 
workers, because employers can predict that women are more likely to take FMLA leave). 
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i i i .  substantive advantages of universalist approaches 
Not all of the arguments for universalist approaches to civil rights are 
purely tactical. Others are substantive. Defenders of universalism argue that 
universalist approaches do a better job of promoting equality and dignity—not 
just because they are more likely to be adopted and enforced than targeted 
approaches, but also because they are more effective policy tools for solving 
civil rights problems. But this set of arguments, like the tactical arguments 
addressed in the previous Part, holds only sometimes. Other times, universalist 
approaches may actually undermine substantive civil rights goals. 
A. The Substantive Argument for Universalism 
Universalist approaches might be substantively superior to targeted ones in 
two respects: first, they might help to overcome limitations in the reach or 
enforcement of targeted civil rights laws that would otherwise allow group-
based discrimination to escape sanction; second, they might protect interests in 
citizenship or dignity that are threatened by conduct that is neither group-
based nor discriminatory but that nonetheless deserve protection. 
1. More Effectively Address Discrimination  
For a variety of reasons, group-based antidiscrimination laws will 
predictably fail to eliminate discrimination and group-based inequality. For 
example, the existence of persistent racially polarized voting makes it difficult 
as a practical matter to disentangle racial motivations for election-law changes 
from partisan or political motivations for those changes.78 As a result, many 
voting restrictions that are in fact motivated by race will predictably escape 
liability under a law that prohibits voting discrimination, because it will be 
difficult for a plaintiff to prove that race, rather than politics, was the true 
motivation.79 In the workplace context, the widespread persistence of the 
 
78.  See Hasen, supra note 2, at 60; Pildes, supra note 2, at 761. For an example of some of the 
difficulties of disentangling racial and political motivations in this context, see Easley v. 
Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 243-58 (2001). 
79.  Thus, in the litigation challenging voting restrictions implemented in the wake of the 
Supreme Court’s Shelby County decision, both Texas and North Carolina have defended 
their restrictive laws on the ground that they targeted Democrats, not minorities—even 
though minorities consistently and overwhelmingly support Democrats in those states. See 
Hasen, supra note 2. 
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baseline rule of employment-at-will similarly hides intentional discrimination 
by “facilitat[ing] employers’ assertion of pretextual reasons for termination.”80 
Indeed, the difficulty in proving intentional discrimination exists throughout 
civil rights law. Congress has frequently responded by prohibiting actions that 
have an unjustified disparate impact on protected groups.81 But plaintiffs face 
significant hurdles in proving disparate impact as well.82 
A universalistic approach could overcome these problems by uniformly 
prohibiting certain actions that are often discriminatory without requiring 
proof of discrimination in any individual case. A statute might prohibit 
changes from district-by-district to at-large elections, for example, or it might 
prohibit restrictive voter identification laws. In the employment context, a 
statute might prohibit employers from terminating any employee without good 
cause. Classic examples of prophylaxis, laws like these would sweep more 
broadly than simply prohibiting discrimination, but they would do so in order 
to ensure that discrimination did not escape sanction. 
Universalist approaches can also help to overcome a distinct limitation of 
antidiscrimination laws. Antidiscrimination laws focus on identifying unequal 
treatment by bad actors, but they do so against a taken-for-granted baseline of 
social and institutional structures. Those structures may themselves limit the 
opportunities of members of certain groups, whether by limiting access to 
material goods that are necessary for opportunity or by constructing identities 
in a way that reinforces limiting stereotypes.83 Professor Catherine Albiston, 
for example, argues that the Pregnancy Discrimination Act fails to achieve 
gender equality because it takes for granted workplace time standards that 
embody unequal cultural conceptions of gender and work.84 Universal work-
life protections like the FMLA, she argues, can attack these gender inequalities 
at a deeper, institutional level.85 Similarly, I have argued that the ADA’s 
 
80.  Bagenstos, Employment Law, supra note 5, at 245; see Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge 
Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1995); Joseph E. Slater, The “American 
Rule” That Swallows the Exceptions, 11 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 53 (2007). 
81.  See George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact, Discrimination, and the Essentially Contested Concept 
of Equality, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2313 (2006). 
82.  See Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 55, at 13-14, 21-24; Michael Selmi, Was the 
Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 734-53 (2006). 
83.  I have emphasized the limits of antidiscrimination law in overcoming deep-rooted structural 
inequalities in Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 YALE L.J. 1 (2004) 
[hereinafter Bagenstos, Future of Disability]; and Bagenstos, Structural Turn, supra note 55. 
84.  See Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093, 1128-55. 
85.  See id. at 1155-65. 
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employment title will fail to achieve disability equality because it takes for 
granted our health insurance system, which represents the largest barrier to 
workforce participation for a large class of individuals with disabilities.86 
Universal health insurance, by contrast, can attack the problem of disability 
inequality on a deeper, structural level.87 And as Professor Ackerman shows in 
his discussion of George Romney’s open housing initiatives, laws prohibiting 
race discrimination in housing can create opportunities for minority-group 
members who are rich enough to afford to buy houses in suburban 
communities, but those laws are of far less utility in combating the economic 
disadvantage that keeps many minorities from being able to afford such houses 
in the first place.88 
2. Address Broader but Important Problems of Inequality and Injustice 
The first set of substantive arguments suggested that universalist 
approaches can do a better job than targeted ones of identifying and uprooting 
the group-based discrimination that is the target of most civil rights laws. But 
advocates have offered a more far-reaching substantive justification for 
universalist approaches. Those approaches, they argue, can address problems 
of inequality and injustice that go well beyond the sorts of group-based 
discrimination that civil rights laws generally target. 
Some of these advocates argue that universalist approaches can 
appropriately focus the law on group-based disadvantages that are broader 
than, or even orthogonal to, the group-based disadvantages on which civil 
rights laws tend to focus. Supporters of class-based affirmative action, for 
example, argue that poverty is a more important barrier to social mobility than 
race, and that race-based affirmative action provides the most benefit to those 
racial minorities who already have the most advantages.89 Before his 
appointment to the bench, Clarence Thomas thus argued that “[a]ny 
preferences given should be directly related to the burdens that have been 
unfairly placed in those individuals’ paths, rather than on the basis of race or 
 
86.  See Bagenstos, Future of Disability, supra note 83, at 26-34. 
87.  See id. at 74. 
88.  See 3 ACKERMAN, supra note 3, at 326. 
89.  See Kahlenberg, supra note 29, at 1060 (arguing that, for this reason, class-based affirmative 
action “does a better job of providing equal opportunity than . . . the current system of 
affirmative action”); see also WILSON, supra note 42. 
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gender, or on other characteristics that are often poor proxies for true 
disadvantage.”90 
Other advocates argue that universalist approaches are superior because 
they vindicate rights or interests that everyone shares. For example, Professor 
Issacharoff and others argue that universalist protections of the right to vote 
are preferable to bans on voting discrimination because everyone has an 
interest in voting—one that is not fully protected by an antidiscrimination 
law.91 In the workplace context, I have advocated universalist protections on 
the ground that they can protect each worker’s interest in being treated as a 
social equal with his or her boss.92 Others have advocated particular 
universalist workplace protections on the ground that they protect each 
worker’s privacy or dignity.93 A targeted antidiscrimination law cannot achieve 
these goals as effectively, because it provides no effective tools to respond to 
cases in which all workers are denied treatment that vindicates their interests in 
social equality, privacy, and dignity. 
B. Problems with the Substantive Argument 
Notwithstanding these potential substantive advantages of universalist 
approaches to civil rights problems, the breadth of those approaches can 
undermine civil rights goals as well. Framing the law in broad, universalistic 
terms can dilute the protections enjoyed by the groups that were the original 
intended beneficiaries of antidiscrimination laws. Even worse, universalist 
approaches will often address broader problems of inequality and injustice only 
by taking for granted, and indeed entrenching, pre-existing group-based 
inequalities. 
For those who believe that a broad, universalist approach to issues of 
inequality can best address the problems of group-based inequality that are the 
 
90.  Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not Tough Enough, 5 
YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 402, 410-11 (1987). 
91.  See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 113 (“Election officials are entrusted 
with administration of a system fraught with the potential for ends-oriented misbehavior, 
whether predicated on race, partisanship, personal gain, political favoritism, or outright 
corruption.”); Jonathan Soros & Mark Schmitt, The Missing Right: A Constitutional Right to 
Vote, DEMOCRACY, Spring 2013, at 22 (arguing for a universalist right-to-vote amendment to 
the Constitution). 
92.  See Bagenstos, Employment Law, supra note 5. 
93.  See, e.g., David C. Yamada, Workplace Bullying and American Employment Law: A Ten-Year 
Report and Assessment, 32 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 251 (2010). 
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principal focus of targeted civil rights laws, the New Deal should offer a 
cautionary lesson. As described in great detail, most recently by Ira Katznelson, 
the social and economic legislation of the New Deal, while broadly 
redistributive, was designed in a way that minimized its challenges to the racial 
caste system that existed in the American South.94 New Deal programs also 
took for granted a gendered division of labor, in which men were understood 
as the primary wage-earners, and women, if they worked at all, were consigned 
to subordinated jobs.95 By granting protections to workers in predominantly 
white and male jobs, while denying them to workers in job classifications 
dominated by minorities and women, many of these programs entrenched race 
and gender inequality at the same time as they alleviated economic inequality 
—even when they did not on their face discriminate based on race or gender. 
Current proposals for class-based affirmative action may have similar 
substantive limitations. They may alleviate economic inequality but do very 
little to promote racial equality.96 And, as Professor Deborah Malamud argues, 
policymakers’ understandings of class may fail to appreciate race and sex 
dynamics in the transmission of wealth. Professor Malamud cites “ample 
evidence that the interactions among economic factors differ for men and 
women, that women are less able than men to take personal advantage of 
inherited and earned economic and social capital, and that occupational 
schemes developed for men are less accurate for women.”97 She also notes that 
“the past and present effects of discrimination mean that blacks and whites 
who appear to have the same occupation, education, or residential situation 
when a simple metric is used may well not occupy the same status in reality.”98 
An admissions program that looks simply to generic socioeconomic data will 
 
94.  See IRA KATZNELSON, FEAR ITSELF: THE NEW DEAL AND THE ORIGINS OF OUR TIME (2013); 
see also ROBERT C. LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING THE COLOR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN 
WELFARE STATE (1998); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM 
UNDERMINED THE WAR ON POVERTY (1994); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act: Racial Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1335 (1987). Federal 
programs supporting homeownership infamously promoted racial segregation in housing 
during this period. See BONASTIA, supra note 67, at 61-65. 
95.  See ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR 
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA (2001); SUZANNE METTLER, DIVIDING 
CITIZENS: GENDER AND FEDERALISM IN NEW DEAL PUBLIC POLICY (1998). 
96.  See Fallon, supra note 73, at 1947-49 (noting that most beneficiaries of class-based 
affirmative action are likely to be white). 
97.  Deborah C. Malamud, Class-Based Affirmative Action: Lessons and Caveats, 74 TEX. L. REV. 
1847, 1891 (1996). 
98.  Id. at 1892. 
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categorize many women and minorities as being less “disadvantaged” than they 
actually are. It may also give preferences to at least some less “disadvantaged” 
men and whites over more “disadvantaged” women and minorities. As a result, 
class-based affirmative action may actually further entrench race and sex 
inequality.99 
Professor Jessica Clarke makes a similar argument against universalist 
protections of work/life balance. She contends that because of society’s 
gendered division of labor, women will often use these protections to take time 
off work to take care of family, while men will often use them to make 
themselves better workers (by, for example, taking classes to improve their 
work-related skills). If so, the protections will reinforce, rather than 
undermine, pre-existing gender inequalities.100 Moreover, Clarke argues, pre-
existing stereotypes may affect not just the way beneficiaries use universalist 
protections, but also the way regulated entities and courts apply those 
protections. In the work/life context, she contends, employers deciding what 
accommodations to grant—and courts deciding what accommodations to 
require—will often fall back on (gendered) stereotypes about what are 
sufficiently important reasons to miss work.101 A recent experimental study of 
managers’ responses to workplace flexibility requests lends additional credence 
to these concerns. That study found that “managers were most likely to grant 
flextime to high-status men seeking flexible schedules in order to advance their 
careers,” while “flexible scheduling requests from women were unlikely to be 
granted irrespective of their job status or reason.”102 
More generally, as Professor Yoshino argues, universalism may “paper[] 
over the subordination in need of . . . correction.”103 Yoshino gives the example 
of universalist arguments for reproductive autonomy—an argumentative frame 
that, in his words, “elides the real biological differences between men and 
women that make the exercise of this right completely different for the two 
sexes.”104 In a different context, Professor Elizabeth Emens suggests that 
universalist requirements for workplace accommodations might fail to take 
 
99.  See id. at 1890-94. 
100.  See Clarke, supra note 10, at 1274-78. 
101.  Id. at 1269-70. 
102.  Victoria L. Brescoll, Jennifer Glass & Alexandra Sedlovskaya, Ask and Ye Shall Receive? The 
Dynamics of Employer-Provided Flexible Work Options and the Need for Public Policy, 69 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 367, 367 (2013). 
103.  Yoshino, supra note 26, at 798. 
104.  Id. 
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account of “disabled people and their particular needs.”105 Professor Catherine 
MacKinnon similarly argues that universalist protections against workplace 
harassment fail to take account of the unique harms of sex-based harassment 
against women.106 Taking this point a step further, Clarke argues that such 
protections—often framed these days as prohibitions of workplace 
“bullying”—may actually harm women. Employers and courts will view the 
concept through the lens of gender stereotypes, she contends, and they may 
find aggressive behavior by women to be bullying in circumstances in which 
they would find equally aggressive behavior by men to be normal and 
acceptable.107 
The issue here is not just that universalistic approaches may be poorly 
designed—a problem that technocratic tinkering would resolve. The issue is a 
mismatch between universalist solutions and the problem of racial or other 
group-based subordination. Since universalists argue that their preferred 
policies will solve problems that are broader than and different from those 
solved by targeted policies, it should be no surprise that universalist solutions 
will not always do as well at solving the problems for which targeted policies 
are designed. 
 
*  *  * 
 
As with the tactical arguments for universalism, the substantive arguments 
are ambiguous. In some circumstances, universalist approaches will be 
substantively better—notably where group-based discrimination is hard to 
prove, or where the problem is not just discrimination but the deeper, taken-
for-granted structural background. But in others—where they dilute 
protections enjoyed by the beneficiaries of targeted laws, or where they 
entrench existing group-based inequalities—they will undermine civil rights 
goals. 
 
105.  Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 894 (2008). 
106.  CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX 
DISCRIMINATION 88 (1979). 
107.  See Clarke, supra note 10, at 1253-54. 
 
universalism and civil rights  
2863 
 
iv.  expressive advantages of universalist approaches 
A final category of arguments for universalism is expressive. Many 
advocates defend universalist approaches based on the messages they send.108 
But here, too, the takeaway is ambiguous. 
A. The Expressive Argument for Universalism 
Targeted civil rights laws, the expressive argument goes, depend on and 
feed essentializing stereotypes about the characteristics of members of 
particular groups. Professor Albiston’s case for the superiority of the FMLA 
provides an example of this sort of argument. As I noted earlier, Albiston 
contends that Title VII’s reach is unduly limited because it takes for granted 
work practices (regarding the availability of part-time work or sick leave, for 
example) that may themselves be deeply infused with, and indeed constitutive 
of, gender roles.109 Because the statute “tends to focus only on the gender side 
of the equation without interrogating work practices,” she argues, “it invites 
courts to locate barriers to working in the personal circumstances and choices 
of women, and not in the structure of work itself.”110 By so doing, it “reinforces 
institutionalized work practices that push workers, both men and women, to 
adopt traditional gender roles at home.”111 In the end, the “process of defining 
what gender and work mean for purposes of legal analysis tends to solidify and 
naturalize existing conceptions of these categories, and the relationship 
between them, in ways that undermine social change.”112 She contends that a 
universal workplace flexibility law, like the FMLA, can help solve these 
problems:  
When the focus shifts away from who is protected by 
antidiscrimination statutes to what work should look like, the question 
is not whether women should get special treatment even though they 
cannot live up to deeply entrenched time norms in the workplace. The 
 
108.  For a generally supportive treatment of the expressive value of law, see Elizabeth S. 
Anderson & Richard H. Pildes, Expressive Theories of Law: A General Restatement, 148 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1503 (2000). 
109.  See Albiston, supra note 84, at 1155. 
110.  Id. 
111.  Id. 
112.  Id. at 1155-56. 
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question becomes whether the institution of work itself should be 
restructured by law, and along with it both the workplace and the non-
workplace ways of organizing social life around traditional gendered 
roles.113 
Relatedly, I have argued that targeted disability protections may entrench the 
public view that “people with disabilities are not capable of providing for 
themselves.”114 And Yoshino has defended a universal liberty-based approach 
to the Fourteenth Amendment on the basis that “it is less likely to essentialize 
identity” than is a targeted equality-based approach.115 
Advocates of universalist approaches also make a distinct expressive 
argument. They contend that targeted approaches to civil rights problems are 
divisive. Targeted approaches, they argue, send a Balkanizing message that we 
should think of ourselves as defined by our membership in particular, socially 
salient groups. Universalist approaches, by contrast, “stress[] the interests we 
have in common as human beings rather than the demographic differences that 
drive us apart.”116 They can, advocates contend, help to build social solidarity 
across group lines.117 
B. Problems with the Expressive Argument 
The essential problem with the expressive argument for universalism is 
that it rests on the premise that the message expressed by a law turns on its 
legal form. The argument seems to run that if a law specifically treats people 
differently based on their group status, or requires judges, administrators, or 
regulated entities applying the law to consider individuals’ group status, then it 
will send the message that group status matters, but if a law is not specifically 
framed in group-based or targeted terms, then it will not send such a 
message.118 That argument is plausible, but it is just as plausible that many 
 
113.  Id. at 1156-57. 
114.  BAGENSTOS, DISABILITY RIGHTS, supra note 5, at 144. 
115.  Yoshino, supra note 26, at 795. 
116.  Id. at 793. 
117.  See Kahlenberg, supra note 29, at 1063-64 (arguing that class-based affirmative action can 
bring people together across racial lines). 
118.  Justice Kennedy’s recent race jurisprudence seems to rest on such a premise. See Parents 
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 788-89 (2007) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Siegel, supra note 28. 
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laws will have a social meaning that does not turn on such formalities. Indeed, 
the basic argument of the leading scholarly work on race and the social 
meaning of law is that social meaning does not turn on legal form—or even the 




summary of arguments 
 
 Arguments for  
Universalism 
Arguments Against  
Universalism 
Tactical 
 Secure political support 
 Ensure broad judicial 
implementation 
 Undermine political support 
 Dilute judicial willingness to 
enforce 
 Become coded as serving a 
particular group 
Substantive 
 More effectively address 
discrimination 
 Address broader problems 
of injustice 
 Dilute protections enjoyed by 
original beneficiaries 




 Undermine essentializing 
stereotypes 
 Send a message of 
community unity 




 As I have noted in the previous two Parts, even universalist civil rights 
laws are likely to reflect and transmit pervasive group-oriented stereotypes. 
This might happen because the public understands universalist approaches as 
really focusing their benefits on particular groups (I argued, for example, that 
the public may well understand class-based affirmative action as another 
 
119.  See Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious 
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 323-26 (1987) (arguing that a test focused on intent fails to 
capture important elements of racism and racial impact). 
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program that protects racial minorities, albeit one that does so through indirect 
means). Alternatively, it might happen because the application and 
enforcement of a universalist law reflects essentializing stereotypes. Consider, 
in this regard, Jessica Clarke’s argument that universalist workplace flexibility 
laws will merely become a vehicle through which workers, employers, and 
courts implement their views of proper gender roles. If dynamics like this exist, 
universalist approaches are as likely as targeted ones to send divisive and 
essentializing messages. 
v. notes on voting rights after shelby county 
The preceding analysis has operated at a very high level of generality. Is it 
helpful in analyzing the actual problems of civil rights law? I believe it is. 
Advocates of universalist approaches to civil rights law often conflate the 
tactical, substantive, and expressive arguments for universalism. It is only by 
disentangling these threads and carefully examining how they apply to a 
particular context that we can determine whether a universalist approach in 
that context makes sense. In this Part, I illustrate the point by discussing the 
recent proposals for a universalist approach to voting rights. I argue that such 
an approach will not address key problems to which voting rights policy 
should respond. 
A. Unpacking the Post-Shelby Universalist Proposals 
After the Supreme Court’s decision to strike down a key part of the Voting 
Rights Act preclearance regime in Shelby County v. Holder,120 a number of 
prominent commentators urged that Congress and civil rights advocates 
respond with a universalist approach. Professor Samuel Issacharoff, for 
example, argues for a regime of “smart disclosure,” in which states that change 
procedures relating to federal elections must file “voting impact statements,” 
signed by the chief election official and available on the internet.121 He frames 
 
120.  133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
121.  See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 121-22. Spencer Overton argues that 
increased disclosure is necessary but not sufficient as a response to Shelby County. See 
Spencer Overton, Voting Rights Disclosure, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 19 (2013). Before the Court’s 
decision in Shelby County, Guy Charles and Luis Fuentes-Rohwer argued for a “contingency 
strategy” that relies on institutional intermediaries to obtain and disseminate information 
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his proposal as one “designed to facilitate” litigation under what he calls the 
“new Equal Protection Jurisprudence”122 stemming from Bush v. Gore.123 
Issacharoff describes that jurisprudence, which is not focused on race, as 
“responding to the more overt manipulations of the ballot for partisan ends, 
and based on a novel form of intermediate scrutiny that tests in a serious way a 
legislature’s actual justifications for new regulations of the voting process.”124 
Richard Hasen similarly argues that courts assessing voting restrictions should 
adopt a “strict scrutiny light” standard:  
When a legislature passes an election-administration law . . . 
discriminating against a party’s voters or otherwise burdening voters,  
. . . courts should read the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection 
Clause to require the legislature to produce substantial evidence that it 
has a good reason for burdening voters and that its means are closely 
connected to achieving those ends.125  
Even before the Shelby County decision (though plainly anticipating it), 
Richard Pildes argued that federal voting legislation, rather than aiming 
primarily at race discrimination, should focus “on defining the appropriate 
baseline of proper election practices—precisely as [the Help America Vote Act] 
does with respect to provisional ballots and the [National Voter Registration 
Act] does with respect to voter registration.”126 
How should we assess these calls for universalist approaches to voting 
rights? The first thing to do is to unpack the arguments that their proponents 
offer in support of them. These arguments have blended together tactical and 
substantive considerations. To be sure, their major rhetorical thrust has been 
substantive. Thus, Professor Issacharoff argues that the Voting Rights Act 
 
about voting changes. See Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Mapping a Post-
Shelby County Contingency Strategy, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 131 (2013), http:// 
yalelawjournal.org/forum/mapping-a-post-shelby-county-contingency-strategy. For an 
influential pre-Shelby County argument for disclosure, see Heather K. Gerken, A Third Way 
for the Voting Rights Act: Section 5 and the Opt-In Approach, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 708, 724 
(2006). 
122.  Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 103, 123. 
123.  531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam). 
124.  Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 107. 
125.  Hasen, supra note 2, at 62. 
126.  Pildes, supra note 2, at 756. 
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model is a poor fit with what he calls “the voting problems of today.”127 In this, 
he echoes Professor Pildes’s argument that a universalist model “better fits the 
voting-rights problems of today.”128 So what are the voting problems of today? 
To Professor Issacharoff, they are largely questions of access to the ballot, 
implicated by state laws imposing voter identification requirements and 
restrictions on early voting.129 He acknowledges that such restrictions likely 
have “a disparate racial impact,” but argues that the racial impact is “likely the 
means rather than the end”—the end being partisan or incumbent 
entrenchment.130 The fundamental substantive issue in the voting context, he 
suggests, is not race but the “conflict of interest” that exists when elections are 
run by partisan officials who are the co-partisans of, or at times the very same 
individuals as, “those who stand to benefit from the rules they create or 
enforce.”131 Professor Issacharoff’s call to move “beyond the discrimination 
model” aims at this general problem of conflict of interest, whether 
instantiated in race discrimination or other forms of entrenchment. Thus, 
Professor Issacharoff relies on the “address-broader-problems-of-injustice” 
variant of the substantive argument for universalism. 
Professor Hasen takes much the same position, though he also emphasizes 
the “more-effectively-address-discrimination” variant of the substantive 
argument. He pitches his proposal for “strict scrutiny light” in all cases 
involving election restrictions as one that will attack race discrimination as part 
of combatting a broader problem. “[T]his new rule,” he argues, “will inhibit 
discrimination on the basis of both race and party, and protect all voters from 
unnecessary burdens on the right to vote.”132 
But there is an undeniable tactical undercurrent to these proposals as well. 
Thus, Professor Issacharoff notes that “[o]ne reading” of Shelby County is “that 
the race discrimination structure of section 5 could not be justified in light of 
 
127.  Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 96; see also id. at 104 (“In terms of crafting 
a post-Shelby County regime of legal protection of the right to vote, the question for today is 
how much of the terrain the civil rights model still captures.”); id. at 120 (asserting an 
“increasing mismatch between the narrow civil rights model and the nature of 
contemporary threats to the right to vote”). 
128.  Pildes, supra note 2, at 744. 
129.  See Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 103; see also Pildes, supra note 2, at 750-
52 (discussing contemporary obstacles to voting). 
130.  Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 103. 
131.  Id. at 113-14. 
132.  Hasen, supra note 2, at 62. 
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the increasing distance between the prohibitions and the distinct practices of 
racial exclusion that lie at the heart of the Voting Rights Act.”133 He contrasts 
the Court’s skepticism of the civil rights model with its expansive 
interpretation of Congress’s Elections Clause authority in Arizona v. Inter-
Tribal Council of Arizona, Inc.,134 as well as with the Sixth Circuit’s creation of 
“a new constitutional jurisprudence” of voting protections derived from Bush v. 
Gore.135 It is not hard to detect the suggestion that the more universalistic 
approaches represented by Elections Clause legislation and Bush v. Gore 
litigation are more likely to gain traction with the courts than beefing up the 
civil rights model is. 
For his part, Professor Hasen is explicit that he believes that challenges to 
voting restrictions under antidiscrimination laws are unlikely to be successful 
with the current federal courts.136 Although he recognizes that some may 
believe his universalist approach “does not give race enough of an explicit role,” 
Professor Hasen defends it on tactical grounds: “[I]t is unrealistic,” he says “to 
expect the current Supreme Court to endorse laws policing subtle 
discrimination in voting. The stronger claim before this Supreme Court is to 
protect the voting process from partisan manipulation.”137 Professor Issacharoff 
and Professor Hasen thus both rely on the “ensure-judicial-willingness-to-
enforce” variant of the tactical argument for universalism. 
I may be reading too much into these arguments, but I also perceive an 
important expressive undertone to them. Because the right to vote is at the core 
of modern notions of citizenship, perhaps universalist rules governing voting 
are especially important because they express a notion of equal citizenship in a 
way that more particularized rules as applied to other spheres (education, 
employment, and so forth) might not.138 The promotion of universalism in 
voting might therefore connect with a broader skepticism about the expressive 
effects of certain particularistic approaches to voting rights—notably the use of 
 
133.  Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 117. 
134.  133 S. Ct. 2247 (2013). 
135.  Issacharoff, supra note 2, at 107. 
136.  See Hasen, supra note 2, at 66-67. 
137.  Id. at 73. 
138.  For the classic argument that different principles of distribution might apply to different 
spheres of social activity, see MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF 
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
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the Voting Rights Act to encourage the creation of majority-minority districts 
that subordinated other redistricting principles to race.139 
B. Critiquing the Post-Shelby Universalist Proposals 
Let’s examine each of these arguments in turn. First, do universal 
approaches effectively attack the voting problems of today? As I argued above, 
a major critique of the substantive argument for universalism is that 
universalist approaches may divert attention from persistent problems of 
discrimination and thereby leave those problems in place. That critique seems 
fully applicable to the post-Shelby proposals for voting rights universalism. 
Those proposals focus on the problem of vote denial—restrictions on the 
opportunity to register to vote or cast a ballot.140 There is no doubt that vote 
denial is a major problem, and a number of formerly covered states adopted 
laws restricting registration and voting in the immediate aftermath of Shelby 
that raised serious concerns about discrimination.141 A universalistic approach 
that effectively attacked burdensome identification laws and limits on early 
voting would serve civil rights interests.142 
But such a law would also leave a lot of significant discrimination against 
black and Latino voters unremedied. That is because a great deal of that 
discrimination involves vote dilution, not vote denial, and it takes place at the 
county and local, not state, level.143 Indeed, the overwhelming majority of 
section 5 objections since 2000—86.4%—involved localities rather than 
states.144 In the wake of Shelby County, a number of formerly covered localities 
have acted quickly to take actions (altering electoral districts, moving from 
 
139.  For a discussion of the expressive harms of such redistricting, see Richard H. Pildes & 
Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, “Bizarre Districts,” and Voting Rights: Evaluating 
Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 483 (1993). 
140.  See generally Daniel P. Tokaji, The New Vote Denial: Where Election Reform Meets the Voting 
Rights Act, 57 S.C. L. REV. 689 (2006). 
141.  For a good roundup of laws passed in the immediate aftermath of Shelby County, see Kara 
Brandeisky & Mike Tigas, Everything That’s Happened Since Supreme Court Ruled on Voting 
Rights Act, PROPUBLICA, Nov. 1, 2013, http://www.propublica.org/article/voting-rights-by 
-state-map. 
142.  In a few paragraphs, I’ll turn to the question whether a universalist law would be effective in 
achieving that goal. 
143.  See Overton, supra note 121, at 24. 
144.  See Justin Levitt, VRA Preclearance (A Response to Pildes/Tokaji, pt. 2), ELECTION L. BLOG 
(Aug. 19, 2013, 5:16 PM), http://electionlawblog.org/?p=54569. 
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district-based to at-large elections, changing election dates, and so forth) that 
dilute the voting strength of growing black and Latino communities.145 And the 
actions taken by Kansas and Arizona to adopt separate registration systems for 
state and federal elections146—which, in Arizona’s case, would likely have 
drawn an objection under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act147—highlight the 
limits of the Elections Clause in protecting voters in state and local elections. 
All of this suggests that the universalist proposals offered by scholars like 
Professors Issacharoff and Hasen—and Professor Pildes before them—rely on a 
very partial understanding of what are “the voting problems of today.” By 
focusing on voting-access rules, usually statewide, that are likely to be 
consequential in national elections,148 those proposals do not address the 
suppression of the effective power of minority voters on the local level. The 
proposals also fail to address the way race discrimination can instantiate 
differently in different times and places. A voter identification law may not be 
especially burdensome for most voters in most places, but in some 
communities the same law may be quite burdensome for an identifiable and 
disproportionately minority-heavy group of voters. There may be no 
universalistic reason why we should require states to hold early voting on 
Sunday afternoons. But if the African American churches in a given state have 
 
145.  See, e.g., Zachary Roth, Breaking Black: The Right-Wing Plot to Split a School Board, MSNBC, 
Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/blacks-texas-town-fear-return-old-days 
(describing “a series of audacious political and legal maneuvers” used by “a group of white 
conservatives” to “try to seize control” of the Beaumont, Texas, school board “from its black 
majority”); Zachary Roth, Georgia GOP Dusts off Jim Crow Tactic: Changing Election  
Date, MSNBC, Nov. 22, 2013, http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/gop-revives-jim-crow-tactic 
(describing a post-Shelby County move to change the municipal election date in Augusta, 
Georgia, to a date “when far fewer blacks make it to the polls”); Robert Stein, An Analysis of 
Voter Support for City of Pasadena Proposition 1: November 2013, HOUS. CHRON.: BAKER  
INST. BLOG (Nov. 27, 2013), http://blog.chron.com/bakerblog/2013/11/an-analysis-of-voter 
-support-for-city-of-pasadena-proposition-1-november-2013 (discussing the replacement of 
two single-member city council districts with at-large seats in a Texas city in the first 
election following Shelby County). 
146.  See Ari Berman, Separate and Unequal Voting in Arizona and Kansas, NATION BLOG (Oct.  
15, 2013, 11:07 AM), http://www.thenation.com/blog/176650/separate-and-unequal-voting 
-arizona-and-kansas. 
147.  See Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273 (1997); Brenda Wright, Young v. Fordice, Challenging 
Dual Registration Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, 18 MISS. C. L. REV. 67 (1997). 
148.  Professors Issacharoff and Pildes are explicit in their focus on those decisions that are likely 
to be consequential in national elections, perhaps because they believe that in cases where 
the stakes are highest, manipulation of the electoral process is most likely. See Issacharoff, 
Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 104; Pildes, supra note 2, at 748-49. 
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used early voting on Sunday afternoons to mobilize their parishioners to bring 
their “souls to the polls,”149 we may legitimately fear that discrimination is 
afoot when the state seeks to eliminate that early-voting opportunity. 
And of course when we move from issues of vote denial to those of vote 
dilution, universalistic approaches offer even less traction against race 
discrimination (and Issacharoff, Pildes, and Hasen do not argue to the 
contrary). In the abstract, at-large and district-based elections could both be 
consistent with democratic theory or principles of good government. But if a 
municipality changes from one to the other form of representation in response 
to changing racial demographics, we may legitimately fear discrimination. A 
universalist approach provides no basis to attack this sort of change—which is 
an extremely common means by which minority voters are deprived of full and 
equal participation in local democracy. 
To be sure, this disagreement might simply be a normative one. Perhaps 
those who urge a universalistic approach to voting rights after Shelby simply 
are skeptical that vote dilution is a significant harm—or a harm as significant as 
vote denial. Space constraints prevent me from offering a normative defense of 
the importance of vote dilution here. For my purposes, the crucial point is to 
highlight this normative disagreement. Those who believe that dilution causes 
an important harm will be unable to agree that a law targeted at vote denial 
best responds to “the voting problems of today.” 
The fundamental insight of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act was that 
those who engage in race discrimination in elections are clever, so any attempt 
to identify a set of forbidden voting practices will fail to combat discrimination 
effectively.150 Professor Issacharoff recognizes that a “static regulatory 
structure” will not address the problems in this context, because “electoral 
politics is nothing if not dynamic.”151 But the principal substantive tool he and 
Professor Hasen propose is a universalistic constitutional jurisprudence that 
focuses on obstacles to registering and casting votes. That jurisprudence 
cannot effectively respond to discrimination that (a) involves denying voting 
opportunities that the courts are not prepared to guarantee universally;152 or 
 
149.  See, e.g., Michael C. Herron & Daniel A. Smith, Souls to the Polls: Early Voting in Florida in the 
Shadow of House Bill 1355, 11 ELECTION L.J. 331 (2012). 
150.  See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966). 
151.  Issacharoff, Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 117 (quoting Charles & Fuentes-Rohwer, 
supra note 121, at 132). 
152.  Professor Issacharoff argues that the new equal protection jurisprudence avoids this 
problem by “limit[ing] the prospects for strategic manipulation of access to the franchise by 
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(b) involves vote dilution, not vote denial. This is a major substantive 
limitation of the universalistic proposals. 
Both Professor Issacharoff and Professor Hasen acknowledge that their 
proposals will not fully address specifically racial discrimination in voting—
and, of course, both authors write against a backdrop in which section 2 of the 
Voting Rights Act continues to provide nationwide protection against voting 
discrimination. I think they do not face up to just how important a 
phenomenon specifically racial discrimination continues to be, nor to the limits 
of section 2 as a regulatory tool, though.153 In evaluating their proposals, then, 
much rests on the viability of their tactical arguments. If a universalistic 
approach would attack a meaningful slice of discriminatory conduct, and is the 
most effective way to achieve that goal given current political and judicial 
realties, it is worth supporting. But I believe the tactical arguments for the 
universalist position are likely overblown. 
In this regard, it is notable that the universalistic constitutional 
jurisprudence that both Professor Issacharoff and Professor Hasen promote has 
had only limited success—and no record of success in attacking the sorts of 
vote-denial practices (felon disenfranchisement, voter identification laws) that 
raise the most significant race discrimination concerns. The successful cases 
were all decided by the Sixth Circuit, a court whose decisions are frequently 
reversed by the Supreme Court,154 and the vitality of these cases outside of that 
circuit has yet to be tested. For the most part, the cases have addressed 
questions of statewide uniformity (such as the allocation of voting machines 
out of proportion to the number of voters in different areas of the state155) or 
relatively small-bore questions of election administration (involving such 
matters as the rules for counting provisional ballots miscast due to poll-worker 
error156). The most expansive of these cases, Obama for America v. Husted, did 
address a limitation on early voting, but it merely affirmed a preliminary 
 
state officials” instead of “carv[ing] out new categories of specific entitlements.” Issacharoff, 
Discrimination Model, supra note 2, at 105. But, as I argue in the next few paragraphs, the 
limits that this jurisprudence places on strategic manipulation are not likely to be great. 
153.  For a critique of Professor Issacharoff’s position along these lines, see Overton, supra note 
121. 
154.  See, e.g., Mark Walsh, A Sixth Sense: 6th Circuit Has Surpassed the 9th as the Most Reversed 
Appeals Court, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1, 2012, http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_sixth 
_sense_6th_circuit_has_surpassed_the_9th_as_the_most_reversed_appeal. 
155.  See League of Women Voters v. Brunner, 548 F.3d 463, 477-78 (6th Cir. 2008). 
156.  See Ne. Ohio Coal. for the Homeless v. Husted, 696 F.3d 580, 591-97 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Hunter v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 234-43 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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injunction, not a final judgment on the merits, and its holding may be limited 
to the context of eleventh-hour changes in early voting for some but not all 
voters.157 
These Sixth Circuit cases are no doubt important for the voters and 
candidates affected. And they do, to be sure, rely on important threads in the 
extant Supreme Court cases.158 But their holdings are a long way from 
requiring all voting restrictions to satisfy “a novel form of intermediate 
scrutiny”159—much less “strict scrutiny light” (a standard Professor Hasen 
draws from the dissent in an important voting case).160 Courts have tended to 
resist imposing such heightened scrutiny on voting restrictions generally—
precisely because such a standard would seem to require judges to intervene in 
a wide range of day-to-day voting decisions with no apparent discriminatory 
intent or effect.161 This is a form of the dilution critique of universalism I 
discussed above. If a universalistic approach to voting rights threatens to 
require serious scrutiny of too broad a range of election-administration 
decisions, courts are likely to ratchet down the effective level of scrutiny for 
those decisions across the board. 
And if judges and other actors will resist voting rights measures that target 
race discrimination, it is doubtful that universalist approaches will avoid the 
same fate. Judges may, indeed, be more likely to enforce a voting provision 
targeted to race-based abuse, precisely because it is less destabilizing of the 
electoral system.162 In any event, it is likely that universalist protections of the 
right to vote will quickly become politically coded as being minority-targeted, 
thus undermining the political benefits of the universal frame. Indeed, 
opposition to voter identification laws already seems to have been politically 
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(7th Cir. 2007) (Evans, J., dissenting), aff’d, 553 U.S. 181 (2008)). 
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Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006). 
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coded in this way.163 And that same coding is likely to undermine the 
expressivist effort to send a message of unity. The expressive harms or benefits 
of a legal rule are, I have argued, likely to turn less on its form than on the 
social and political context in which the rule is adopted. 
In my view, although universalistic efforts to promote access to the ballot 
are worthy, voting rights activists should not put most of their energies into 
those sorts of efforts post-Shelby. Professor Issacharoff’s “smart disclosure” 
regime makes sense—and is perhaps needed more at the local level than at the 
state level. But the disclosure regime should be accompanied by rules that are 
specifically directed at the problems of race discrimination in voting. Professor 
Spencer Overton offers a number of good suggestions along these lines, 
including: expanding the Voting Rights Act’s bail-in provision to subject 
jurisdictions with a recent voting rights violation (even one that did not reflect 
intentional discrimination) to preclearance; quicker procedures in Voting 
Rights Act cases (perhaps including looser standards for obtaining preliminary 
injunctions preserving the status quo); and adopting presumptions that 
require states and localities that adopt voting rules that pose a special risk of 
discrimination to “show in court that a change is fair and that less harmful 
alternatives do not exist.”164 The proposed Voting Rights Act Amendments, 
introduced in response to Shelby County, combine universalistic rules (such as 
requiring disclosure of voting changes) with a continued use of a race-targeted 
preclearance regime.165 Race-targeted approaches like these remain essential to 
address the continuing problems of race discrimination in elections. 
conclusion 
The major goal of this essay has been to make a point about universalism 
and civil rights. Many scholars and activists—including me—have urged 
universalist responses to various civil rights problems. But universalism cannot 
be a universal approach to civil rights. To decide whether it makes sense 
requires careful attention to the strengths and weaknesses of the tactical, 
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substantive, and expressive arguments for universalism in each particular 
context in which universalist solutions are proposed. I have illustrated this 
point with a discussion of the most prominent recent iteration of the 
universalism debate in civil rights—the response to the Supreme Court’s Shelby 
County decision. Although many prominent scholars have urged a universalist 
response to that decision, I have argued, on substantive and tactical grounds, 
that an effective response to the problems of voting discrimination continues to 
require laws that target race discrimination directly. 
